

PIN•*Points*

The Processes of International Negotiation Program

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Knowledge Diplomacy: What We Need to Know

Ottawa Roadshow • YSSP • Negotiating Organizational Change •
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International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis
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From the PIN Steering Committee

Science in International Policymaking



Schloss Laxenburg, near Vienna, Austria, home of IIASA and the PIN Program

IIASA is a leading world research institution, whose scientists produce and process new knowledge in a number of important research areas: energy and technology; environment and natural resources; population and society. The Institute in Laxenburg aspires to apply the results of its work in international decision making and regime building, and its track record in this regard is indeed impressive. One well known example of IIASA's work is the RAINS model, which was so successfully used in the negotiations on long-range air pollution in Europe—the complex talks on acid rain. As seen in a pure negotiation perspective, the RAINS model functioned as a combination of mediator and facilitator. All natural scientific research programs at IIASA have in some way or other made significant contributions to international cooperation including in institutions like the United Nations or the European Union. This scientific assistance can be expected to continue to be demanded in the future.

The effective use of scientific knowledge in international policymaking is an important and complex research area in its own right. The first Director of IIASA, Howard Raiffa, who established PIN, the Program on the Processes of International Negotiation, acknowledged this thought. Howard considered that advanced knowledge about international negotiations could give decision support when the scientific knowledge produced by IIASA is brought into international negotiations and organizations.

The PIN Steering Committee continues to argue for, and also further develop, the decision support function that Howard Raiffa envisaged. Various practical approaches have been employed to achieve that aim. Each book that PIN has produced in the last two decades contains a section on lessons for both theory and practice. Several of the Roadshows organized by PIN around the world have taken place at institutions with a close association to the foreign policy practitioners in the country concerned like the Argentine Council for International Relations or the School of International Relations in Tehran.

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Several current PIN projects are closely linked to ongoing international negotiations on life-threatening global issues, which have generated an increased demand for high quality scientific knowledge and information. One PIN project is designed to directly support negotiations pertaining to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Another project proposes concrete measures to facilitate the UN negotiation on climate change, and a third undertaking, which involves several IIASA projects collaborating with PIN, strives to support the building of a multi-issue regime for the Caspian Sea.

However, continued and more structured efforts are needed to pave still better ways for IIASA scientific knowledge into international negotiation processes where critical decisions are taken at the global level. One facilitating approach is to develop better cooperation between natural scientists and PIN negotiation analysts

Continued on page 31

Contents

- 2 Editorial: Science in International Policymaking**
How greater collaboration between the natural and social sciences could be beneficial for organizations like IIASA
- 4 Knowledge Diplomacy: The Things We Need to Know to Understand It Better**
A new concept of negotiation is evolving and growing, supplanting traditional diplomacy. We need to keep it under constant observation
- 8 Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: An International Negotiation Workshop on Mediating Identity Conflicts**
The PIN Roadshow goes to Ottawa
- 9 Negotiating Organizational Change**
Making bumblebees fly and why turkeys never vote for Christmas
- 13 Negotiation as a Choice of Partners**
Choosing who you negotiate with makes quite a difference to outcomes
- 17 Call for Papers**
Dealing with deadlocks: Managing negotiation meltdowns
- 18 Arms Control and Disarmament Verification: Deterrence through Leadership**
A game theoretical approach to CTBT negotiations
- 20 Putting on-site Inspections on the Table: Tabletop Exercises as Means of Negotiations Training for Inspectors**
One of the most important skills that team members can have at their disposal during the on-site inspection process are bargaining skills.
- 22 Development of Negotiation Guidelines for the CTBT–OSI Inspection Team: Cooperation with the PIN Program**
- 23 PIN Interactive: The North–South Divide in the Climate Change Negotiations**
A chance to add your views to this important debate
- 26 Negotiation Support Systems in the Context of Crisis Response Processes**
26–27...plus news of all PIN’s work during the 2009 Young Scientists Summer Program
- 28 Two Forthcoming PIN Books on Terrorism**
- 29 New PIN Policy Brief on Terrorism**
- 30 Renewing the PIN Steering Committee**



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Knowledge Diplomacy: The Things We Need to Know to Understand It Better

A 1994 PIN book, in a straightforward proposition which is still thought-provoking today, states that multilateral negotiation is “the management of complexity” (Zartman, 1994). Complexity in negotiation has many causes and manifestations: the number of participants, the disparity of interests that they represent, and the technical difficulties attached to dealing with many of the issues. Complexity in negotiation also involves the problem of coordinating the basic functions of a multilateral process, such as building a like-minded community of negotiating parties, accommodating diverging party interests, constructing and running an effective organization around the negotiation, and administering the knowledge base for the negotiation.

Many topics addressed in multilateral talks need to be assessed in scientific terms in order to be fully understood and eventually become negotiable. Knowledge management is hence a highly important and also demanding task of multiparty talks, which explains why there is such a large literature on the role of scientists and science in international cooperation and negotiation.

Indeed, the examination of *knowledge diplomacy* needs to continue. There needs to be a constant observation of the consequences of this seemingly expanding role of knowledge diplomacy in international politics: this is particularly important, as these consequences tend to change over time because of the globalization process. While the concept of knowledge diplomacy deserves priority in academic analysis, it also has a considerable policy relevance, which policymakers need to acknowledge. Today, expert skills in knowledge diplomacy are a prerequisite for influence in most international negotiations.


To attain a sufficiently comprehensive overview of knowledge diplomacy, one must look at the concept from different but complementary perspectives. Two such outlooks will be addressed in this brief article.

First, the straightforward power base perspective needs to be considered, in which knowledge/information is seen as a critical component of the power base of individual actors involved in a game of diplomacy such as negotiation.

Second, knowledge/information should also be examined from a systemic perspective and be regarded as one of the elements of an entire negotiation process.

The power base perspective: Knowledge/information in traditional diplomacy

Under certain conditions knowledge diplomacy functions as a power equalizer, increasing the room for manoeuvre of “smart, small states.” (Sundelius, 1995) The international talks on long-range air pollution—acid rain—in Europe in the 1970s offer an interesting example in this respect.



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The negotiations on acid rain unfolded in the context of the United Nations, and most of the states of Eastern and Western Europe as well as the Soviet Union were formal parties to them. The United States and Canada were informal participants, lurking in the background but still maintaining an influence on the negotiation. The talks produced a string of treaties, which considerably reduced the acidification problem in Europe caused by long-range air pollution, and indeed almost eliminated it. This successful outcome was the result of hard negotiation, a power game among nations.

In the beginning the negotiation on acid rain was driven to a large extent by two small states which demonstrated clear leadership capabilities: Norway and Sweden. This achievement was all the more remarkable as the two small-state leaders were opposed by all the Western European great powers, including the Federal Republic of Germany, which at a later stage of the negotiation took over the leadership role.

The key to the Scandinavian leadership in the talks on acid rain was skilful knowledge diplomacy buttressed by a critical power base component: superior knowledge/information about the acidification problem and its international causes. Interested and concerned individuals, organizations, and agencies in Norway and Sweden had discovered and started to analyze and assess the issue of acid rain earlier than other countries. Thanks to an advanced domestic scientific community and new and effective environmental institutions in both Norway and Sweden, analysis of the causes and effects of acid rain by the two nations was very thorough and competent.

The access to superior knowledge/information enabled Scandinavian policymakers and environmental negotiators to take initiatives and table grand proposals that were usually reserved for the great powers. The Scandinavians were also in a strong position to

contradict and disarm the arguments of countries with large sulfur emissions who contended that acid rain produced by long-range air pollution was a relatively minor problem.

A systemic perspective: Consensual knowledge in the "new diplomacy"

The development of a successful large multilateral negotiation can be seen as the establishment of a sequence of accords, one of which is a final grand agreement like the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or its 1997 Kyoto Protocol.

Initially, the future parties agree to start negotiation (e.g., in a ministerial declaration). Later, they establish other accords, for example, concerning the agenda or the formal organization of the negotiation.

One of these subsequent joint decisions of the negotiation parties following the initiation of the talks concerns the establishment of consensual knowledge. This is usually a complex construction with several functions that are difficult to describe adequately in a few words.

In the main, consensual knowledge represents the common but specific understanding that parties have of the issues on the negotiation agenda. When the negotiated issue is particularly complex like, for example, acid rain or climate warming, consensual knowledge contains an important element of (natural) scientific knowledge,

giving it a relatively high degree of authority and acceptance. Usually, consensual knowledge has a considerable strategic significance for the negotiation of which it is part, as it both directs and constrains. An important feature of consensual knowledge relates to how it is actually brought into being, which differs a great deal from how a negotiation's final formal agreement is established.

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The final result of a successful multi-party negotiation typically has the form of a formal treaty with legally binding stipulations. This agreement represents formal international law and usually includes provisions regarding verification procedures or other forms of implementation control. The text of the treaty is formulated in such a way that it should be easy to determine whether or not a signatory party complies with it. At least this is the ambition of the treaty construction "engineers."

The underpinning consensual knowledge is often reflected in negotiated formal agreements, for example, in the preamble to a treaty text or in the spirit of the whole agreement. However, in this case inclusion typically has a special meaning. Whereas the binding provisions of an official treaty

need to be as complete and detailed as possible, consensual knowledge can be referred to only in very general terms in a formal international accord.

A well known case illustrating this is the brief references to neo-classical trade theory incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) treaties, which has provided direction to every round of multilateral trade negotiation in the last 50 years. The members of GATT/WTO have agreed to follow the norms and principles embedded in neo-classical theory which argue for elimination of all obstacles to the free exchange of goods and services on the world markets. The trade theory itself is formulated outside the GATT/WTO agreements in academic literature and textbooks; however, it is acknowledged by the brief references that have been inserted into the treaty texts.

Reaching consensus about issue knowledge is a prerequisite for progress in any negotiation.

Generally, consensual knowledge is too complex and also too vast to be expressed in the treaty language of traditional diplomacy. Nevertheless, consensual knowledge with a broad acceptance in an international negotiation is acknowledged and understood in more or less the same way by most, if not all, of the parties involved, as all parties have access to the same knowl-



Sources: Dreamstime.com (left); Wikipedia (right)



The key to the leadership of Norway and Sweden in the talks on acid rain was skilful knowledge diplomacy buttressed by a critical power base component: superior knowledge/information about the acidification problem and its international causes.



Source: United Nations

Roundtable Discussion on Climate Change: The development of a successful large multilateral negotiation can be seen as the establishment of a sequence of accords, one of which is a final grand agreement like the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or its 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Here the climate community attends a roundtable discussion on "Climate Change: The Scientific Evidence", moderated by Andrew Revkin of the New York Times, at UN Headquarters in New York, September 2007.

edge/information. This is because it is easily accessible in the negotiation system concerned or in other "reservoirs" such as international organizations or high-ranking research institutions.

Reaching consensus about issue knowledge is a prerequisite for progress in any negotiation. This is usually a complex process, which can be difficult to describe. It is not correct to call it formal treaty making. Peter Haas (1992) has suggested calling it the establishment and functioning of an epistemic community. This special type of community is made up of policymakers, scientists, and other experts from many countries, who in different roles and ways are associated with an ongoing negotiation process concerning, for example, a regime for the Mediterranean Sea or climate warming. The actors of the epistemic community are tied together by a common understanding of the issues with which they are con-

cerned in the negotiation with which they are associated.

Consensual knowledge is an important part of this understanding and is often framed and constructed in such a way as to implicitly give direction to the negotiation process of which it is part. Accordingly, consensual knowledge has a great political significance, which is indicated by the presence and rate of activity of policymakers in an epistemic community. Constructing consensual knowledge is part of the grand strategic game of a multilateral negotiation. This process can be fully explained only by reference to a "new diplomacy" which differs from traditional diplomatic activities in certain important respects.

A basic feature of the *new diplomacy* is that actors other than foreign ministry officials become relatively more important than in traditional diplomacy in terms of interaction with other nations or with international organizations (Kjellén, 2007).

These experts tend to take on an increasingly independent role in relation to the foreign ministry, whose supremacy in international affairs is therefore put at risk, at least over a long-term perspective.

Other non-state actors have also become more important in the new diplomacy system. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been given easier access to new diplomacy talks. This development is clearly visible in international environmental cooperation where NGOs have gradually taken on new tasks. For example, NGOs have provided important input information to some complex international negotiations and in other negotiations, they have been given formal monitoring tasks regarding the verification of state compliance with a binding international agreement.

Businesses continue to be important players on many international arenas where states make their political choices. A new development unfolding, particularly

in the Stockholm (1972)—Rio de Janeiro (1992)—Johannesburg (2002) process, is the creation of new partnerships with non-state actors involving international private-sector companies, thereby reinforcing their role in international politics. Cities and other local authorities are also becoming more directly involved in international affairs at the side of state representatives.

An important challenge for the new diplomacy is to develop more effective mechanisms to cope with so-called horizontal issues (e.g., trade/environment) linking the activities of different ministries and central agencies in any given setting, such as an international organization like the United Nations, the WTO, the assembly of institutions supporting the global negotiation on climate warming, or the machinery for policy coordination in the Organization for Economic Coordination and Cooperation OECD).

The new diplomacy typically resembles knowledge management in epistemic communities, having something of an informal character and involving many non-state actors. The resulting consensual knowledge potentially has a great impact on associated negotiations and their outcome. This effect may occur in line with one of two different scenarios.

In the first scenario knowledge diplomacy in an epistemic community gives support to traditional diplomacy in a treaty-making process like the negotiation on long-air range pollution in Europe referred to at the beginning of this article. New diplomacy produces consensual knowledge, which is fed into the treaty-making process and is used by the negotiating parties to work out a formal and binding treaty. In other words, knowledge diplomacy influences the outcome of the negotiation only indirectly.

In the second scenario knowledge diplomacy, the development of an epistemic community, and the construction of consensual knowledge may produce outcomes that are a substitute for binding clauses in a formal negotiated treaty. The principal mechanism driving such a complex development is quasi-informal policy coordination, which has been going on in various international organizations such as the OECD for a long time (Sjöstedt, 1973). Policymakers in many countries utilize large amounts of the consensual knowledge produced in the epistemic community where they have been active. The immediate effect can be described as emerging like-mindedness; this may in the longer term lead to actual policy coordination which may or may not

become acknowledged in a formal treaty at a later stage, as the case may be.

The various aspects of the management of knowledge/information in international negotiation have to be understood separately and in their own right—the superior knowledge/information underpinning the power strategies of traditional diplomacy as distinct from knowledge in an epistemic community which is integrated by scientific values and developed by new diplomacy. Many researchers have engaged themselves in one of these fields—knowledge management in either traditional or new diplomacy. These research activities should continue. However, an even greater priority should be given to research on the relationship between traditional knowledge management and new diplomacy. In this connection a number of critical questions need be addressed:

What institutions need to be further developed (or created) in order to make new diplomacy more effective?

How can new diplomacy support traditional diplomacy more effectively in complex international negotiations like the climate talks?

How should the distribution of work between traditional and new diplomacy best be organized?

Gunnar Sjöstedt



Source: United Nations

The Third Session of the Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC - COP3) met in Kyoto, Japan. The development of a successful large multilateral negotiation can be seen as the establishment of a sequence of accords, one of which is a final grand agreement like the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or its 1997 Kyoto Protocol.

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Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: An International Negotiation Workshop on Mediating Identity Conflicts

6–7 November 2009

Saint Paul University, 223 Main Street, Ottawa, Canada

More than 120 professors, students and practitioners attended a two-day international negotiation workshop on settling identity conflicts at St Paul University, Ottawa, Canada.

The PIN Ottawa Roadshow was a joint collaboration of the Centre for Conflict Education and Research at the Carleton University, the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at the Carleton University, the Conflict Studies Program at the Saint Paul University, and IIASA's Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program. Several PIN Steering Committee members gave presentations.

During the first day of the workshop, PIN representatives shared insights about negotiation and its use in "intervening" in identity conflicts. Professor I. William Zartman noted the concept of the "mutually hurting stalemate" as a prerequisite for parties to a conflict to actively engage in (mediated) negotiations. Professor Valerie Rosoux discussed the additional complexity and uncertainty in reaching agreements where reconciliation within the society is perceived as a goal. Professor Guy Olivier Faure highlighted the importance of maintaining cultural awareness in negotiations. Professor Mark Anstey, an expert on domestic negotiations, for instance, between labor unions and company owners, pinpointed the connection between international mediation and mediation at the national level.

The second day of the workshop focused on the perspectives of Canadian practitioners. Seddiq Weera, policy advisor to the Minister of Education of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, shared his views regarding the "unresolved civil war" in Afghanistan and how it is haunting Afghanistan in its effort to stabilize. Ms. Elissa Goldberg and Mr. Rhett Sangster from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada summarized Canada's initiatives in facilitating discussions, between Pakistan and Afghanistan,

focusing on technical aspects of the border conflict that have contributed to capacity building and good governance.

Ambassador Sam Hanson, former chargé d'affaires of Canada to Sudan, noted the grievances and economic interests behind the "identity badges." Representatives from the PIN Program, in responding to the talks of the practitioners, aimed to bridge the gaps between theory and practice. The second half of the second day of the workshop was organized to encourage audience participation. Four sessions were organized:

Session I (Negotiation and Reconciliation),
Session II (Power and Negotiation),
Session III (Negotiating with Terrorists),
Session IV (Peace vs. Justice in Negotiation).

Ariel Macaspac



The Canada Roadshow, Ottawa: Impressions

Negotiating Organizational Change

Despite the huge wave of transformation initiatives in public and private sector organizations in recent decades, it is estimated that over 70 percent fail to achieve their objectives. Problems lie less in the vision of such initiatives than in their implementation.

Commonly, the complexity of negotiating the spread of multiple stakeholder interests in change projects is underestimated. As systemic change unfolds, leaders of stakeholder groups must make critical choices about process management. The architects of transformation initiatives must choose which stakeholders to involve in what dimensions of change, at what stage, and through what means.

However, these “architects” are not the only ones making choices. All affected groups translate such projects into their effect on their own needs and interests. Grand visions of cooperative endeavor can quickly slip into exchanges of bitter contest, as those pushing for transformation move to coercive tactics and others to litigation or tactics of active resistance to stall or stop the change project. Not uncommonly, tactics of passive resistance are employed to frustrate the process—people attend meetings, nod approval, are collegial ... but nothing happens! As deadlines approach, tension rises, there is greater coercion and resisters dig in, go underground, become too busy to attend meetings or ambush them with walkouts and threats of litigation. Organizational change is really a process of ongoing multiparty negotiation.

The change management process

Within fast-changing environments, organizations are in a continuous search for sustainable competitive advantage. They expend huge energy in transformation drives to “reinvent themselves.” Effective change requires simultaneous coordinated work along many different tracks—organizational direction, identifying new business opportunities, raising quality, reducing cost, improving delivery, organizational redesign, and mobilizing and equipping people to optimize use of money, materials, technology, and data.

Ghoshal and Bartlett (2000) propose that transformation requires a powerful shift in organizational mindset about what is possible and how things might be done to make the seemingly impossible happen—to “make bumblebees fly.” There is a continual search for ways to inspire individual initiative, create and leverage knowledge, and ensure organizational capacity for renewal. In their model this is achieved through shaping people’s behavior along four dimensions (stretch, discipline, support, and trust) and building organizational capabilities and individual competencies. Top management shifts thinking beyond strategy, structure, and systems to purpose, process, and people. Within an inverted organizational model, frontline managers, as organizational entrepreneurs, develop the business, taking responsibility for delivery to organizational objectives, and building customer and external relationships; middle managers must build a winning team through coaching and coordination; top managers create a context in which organizations become winners by empowering rather than controlling people. It



Source: Dreamstime.com

The bumblebee–turkey conundrum: Transformation requires a powerful shift in organizational mindset about what is possible and how things might be done to make the seemingly impossible happen—to “make bumblebees fly.” However, trying to get everyone on board is a sure, time-consuming way to ensure change does not happen —“turkeys never vote for Christmas”.

is not, however, a painless process; indeed there is clear coercion in moving organizations through phases of change—rationalization, revitalization, renewal— and little room for poor performers.

Drawing on the spread of contributors to the field, effective change management requires leaders to create and harness a sense of need and urgency for change, develop a clear mission and value proposition, create a compelling vision around which to mobilize people and set goals, enable leaders at all levels of the organization, develop coherent multitrack strategic change plans, and then

Organization building requires leaders who are more democratic and consensus-driven, who have capacity to “heal” damaged relationships and who are interested in developing staff to achieve organizational objectives.

develop employee competencies to drive the change through and create a culture and climate conducive for them to do so (Anstey, 2006).

Organizations can, of course, be coerced into a new form. New business processes can be imposed, new structural arrangements bullied into place, and employees brought to heel through exhaustion and fear. Indeed, some argue that at least in its early phases, organization change requires coercion—trying to get everyone on board is a sure, time-consuming way to ensure change does not happen—“turkeys never vote for Christmas.” So a logic of “bully through restructuring, rationalize, cut budgets and headcount—then we’ll develop a new culture and rebuild morale” often prevails. Change agents assume the persona of executioners rather than bridge builders, coaches, or healers of relational rifts. Losing disaffected employees early removes poison from the process and means that the challenge of transforming resistance into organizational commitment does not have to be faced. Coercive leadership or pace-setting leadership styles are preferred to achieve quick turnarounds, push the speed of change, and bully through difficult decisions about people and projects.

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But organizations must survive their own change processes. Most can live through a period of organizational “angst,” but few can bear a hemorrhaging of critical skills or see any future in an organization populated by a sullen or resistant workforce. If resistance is to be turned into commitment, leaders of change must be responsive to the “hard” and “soft” dimensions of the change process. Different leadership styles are required to build staff morale, competencies, and motivation, to develop a long-term performance culture and a climate of support rather than fear. A shift from authoritarian to authoritative leadership is required, based on vision and acknowledged expertise rather than position and pugnacious personalities. Organization building requires leaders who are more democratic and consensus-driven, who have capacity to “heal” damaged relationships and who are interested in developing staff to achieve organizational objectives. Coercive and pacesetting styles of leadership are not rooted in ideas of employee participation,

or negotiation and joint problem solving as vehicles for making things happen. They may force through structural and technical aspects of change, but they are seldom sufficient for meaningful transformation in which employees develop higher levels of motivation or acquire new individual and team working competencies to lift performance.

Typically, organizations engage in two forms of change. They re-engineer business processes improving work layouts and methods, improving technology, and introducing systems of continuous improvement, just-in-time delivery, first time quality production to eliminate bottlenecks and unnecessary administrative processes, and reduce waste and inventory. And they restructure, flattening supervisory hierarchies, redesigning divisional arrangements, devolving decision-making authority, executing mergers and acquisitions.

These kinds of initiative are popular because they are highly visible and allow managers to be seen to be “doing something,” but in themselves they are neither ends nor “silver bullets.” Restructuring may do little to change inefficient work processes, eliminate obstructive power plays, improve decision-making processes, develop employees’ skill sets or motivate them to higher levels of performance. But it may see people exhausted by unnecessary change projects, demotivated, and alienated from the work they should be doing.

Change is negotiated through recognizing the spread of fears and interests among organizational stakeholders, and seeking ways to respond to these.

All this serves as a reminder that it is the people in organizations who really deliver them, and suggests that organizational change initiatives should be very carefully undertaken. Change is negotiated through recognizing the spread of fears and interests among organizational stakeholders, and seeking ways to respond to these—the transaction is one around the investment of employee energies and competencies into projects which they often perceive to carry risk for their job or career prospects or whose rationale they doubt. Hard financial realities cannot be pretended away and may translate into rationalizations in




Source: Dreamstime.com

A logic of “bully through restructuring, rationalize, cut budgets and headcount—then we’ll develop a new culture and rebuild morale” often prevails.

Organizational transformation is not simply about technical issues, it is about getting people to do things differently, to break with the past, to take risks, to become motivated about change.

staffing and austerity measures precisely at a time when there is a need to motivate staff, lift morale, and present an exciting new brand to customers and the wider public. Experience indicates how difficult it is to attend to all these concurrently—it is not a task for the faint-hearted! However ordered models of change may appear on paper, the process complexities of achieving agreement on rules of the game, getting each change activity launched, ensuring fair representation on committees, securing resources, dealing with inter-personals (“hundreds of concurrent bar-room scuffles”), portraying a positive image to the media, mobilizing people to the task, dealing with different policies and cultures across institutions, responding to and negotiating differing senses of urgency and pace across Organizations...are difficult! Organizational transformation is not simply about technical issues, it is about getting people to do things differently, to break with the past, to take risks, to become motivated about change. It is the “front-liners” rather than the top management team who ultimately “make bumblebees fly” and they, ultimately, who must deliver a transformation initiative. This is why it is so important that change management be understood not simply as a structural and legal-technical process.

In the face of reservations on the part of many of the institutions involved, the South African government recently pushed through legislation to impose a restructuring of the tertiary education sector across the country through a series of mergers reducing the number of institutions from 36 (21 universities and 15 technikons) to 21 in timeframe of two years (a “big bang” approach). While few questioned the stated objectives to increase production of graduates and research relevant to national needs, promote equity of access to redress inequalities from the apartheid era, promote institutional diversity, build high-level research capacity, and overcome the fragmentation, inequality, and inefficiencies of the past—many questioned wheth-



Negotiating organizational change is a complex undertaking, involving multiple initiatives and arrangements

er the restructuring model imposed would achieve these. One review of early mergers concluded that although they often had a devastating impact on the staff of affected institutions, they produced little in terms of objectives of equity, cost reduction, or efficiencies. A recent survey of employees conducted in one of the merged institutions identified employees as key to the success of organizational change projects.

Apart from achieving a more demographically representative student body, only about 20 percent felt the merger had resulted in an increase in student admissions, in improved design of academic programs, research capacity or delivery to national needs, or the elimination of past inequalities. It may have been too early in the process to say, but the initial employee assessment was that the restructuring had not achieved its objectives. There were other indicators of concern. Over 60 percent felt the new institution had a clear

mission, but only 30 percent that it had a clear implementation plan. Only 36 percent felt the new organization had a clear vision, and fewer than 25 percent that its vision was translated into clear measurable performance objectives or that employees were more certain about how they might personally contribute to achieving these. Most were uncertain about the organization’s financial future. Fewer than 25–30 percent felt the new institution was delivering better services to students, had more efficient administrative processes, or that the merger had seen their departments become more competitive with other universities in terms of quality of outputs (graduates, research, community responsiveness), or the quality of academics it was able to attract or retain. Respondents were negative about reward systems, policy implementation, and behavior of managers and colleagues in developing a new organizational culture.



Source: Dreamstime.com

A recent survey of employees conducted in one of the merged institutions identified employees as key to the success of organizational change projects.

Effective change management requires a shared sense of unease in which people perceive the need to change and feel the urgency of doing so; a clear purpose to give direction and meaning to the process; a compelling vision around which to mobilize energies; clearly defined business objectives to make change efforts practicable; a coherent multitrack management strategy; competent leadership at all levels in the organization; clear communication systems and structures to negotiate and manage the process; competent credible change agents; and a supportive climate (Anstey, 2006).

Conditions were not helpful: the merger was externally imposed with tight deadlines and organizations were obliged to engage as equals in its management. A reluctant leadership was left to negotiate the process. It was not a compelling vision—few felt the merger was conducted for sound reasons or that there was clear urgency for such a move. Coercion erodes trust. While over 70 percent felt that information on the process was supplied at regular intervals, less than a third felt it was sufficient or of the right kind, and only 19 percent that it was trustworthy. About 80 percent felt they were “not heard” and were merely being asked to rubber stamp decisions already made. The tri-partite leadership of the merger did achieve the necessary structural change and policy directives within the legislated deadline, and from a procedural and

technical viewpoint relatively efficiently. A joint management group led the process, negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding, and established task teams comprising members from across the affected organizations to drive the process. However, less than a third of employee respondents felt management had successfully mobilized employees to participate in the merger; and far fewer that the task teams were adequately representative, established early enough, or had the necessary competencies to do the job. The organization is struggling with problems of harmonizing three disparate compensation systems.

In short, a structural change was achieved which left employees behind and ignored their fears and concerns. A new management has taken over the process and now faces the challenge of rebuilding morale in the organization and a sense of commitment to its objectives and operations. To do this the next period of organizational life cannot be managed in the style which brought it to fruition. Coercion must be replaced by consultation, negotiation and problem-solving if the frontliners who deliver the organization are to develop commitment and energy for the project.

Mark Anstey

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Negotiation as a Choice of Partners

Negotiation is a process of identifying an appropriate partner and constructing a joint pact.

The predominant paradigm for studying (and conducting) negotiations is as a search for an agreeable outcome between two positions or interests (Dupont, 2006, pp. 142–143). Negotiation has been analyzed almost universally as an encounter between parties attempting to resolve the incompatibilities—that is, the conflict—between their positions on given issues. It has been defined as the process combining conflicting positions into a common outcome, under a decision rule of unanimity. The focus is on the issue and the divergent positions held on its substance; the assumption is that the common outcome will be found somewhere in between the conflicting positions through concessions and compensations or by their incompatibilities being overcome through construction or reframing. This image is captured clearly in game theoretic presentations, either in matrix or extended form, where outcomes are graded according to their attractiveness to the two defining parties. In all this, the parties are assumed to be, and are relevant only to the extent that they are, bearers of the incompatible positions.

But what if the parties are not evident? What if the conflicting positions are indeed present but disembodied, not fully represented by any actor but awaiting their formulator and spokesperson? What if a number of parties are the grist of the conflict but they are not fully aware of what they are fighting for, only aware of whom (in the plural) they are fighting against? And what if, in addition, the ideational conflict concerns notions of identity and its implications, things done to and by people identified in ascriptive terms, yet with no consensual representative and spokesperson for the aggrieved and/or the aggriever? Negotiation in these conditions becomes merely a philosophical exercise, irrelevant to the conflict, a game of ideas in search of actors, a decision-making process awaiting decision makers. Yet this is the condition of many of the world's current conflicts.

Of course, the role of parties as opposed to substantive issues is recognized in the current approach to negotiation analysis.

The parties are present at the side of the matrices and at the levels of the extended form of game theory analysis, and they are the agents of concession, compromise, and construction. In structural analysis, they are the bearers of power, and in process analysis they are the vehicles of the process. Even in ripeness theory, it is the parties who hold the perceptions that constitute the principal elements of ripeness. The two-level approach to negotiation incorporates different types of actors and bases analysis on their relationship, although it is not the actors but their positions on the issues that determines the dynamic. In all of these, the actors are assumed to exist as the beginning point of the analysis, much as economic concession analysis and game theory assume a fixed opening position in precise terms (Zartman 1978). None of this is realistic in many current conflicts, or if/when it finally is, some of the most important dynamics have been glossed over, just what concession and game theoretic analyses did for the substantive process.

Under these conditions a different approach to negotiation is required. It will begin with a different definition of the subject: Negotiation is a process of identifying an appropriate partner and constructing a joint pact. The focus in this approach is on the parties, who become the vehicles, representatives, and articulators of the positions, but whose selection for treating these matters and for the establishment of a pact is the subject of the negotiation; it is the pact, not the settlement of the issue, that is their outcome. This approach requires more detailed treatment of several aspects: the nature of the pact, the nature and process of the selection, and the relation between the actors and the issues.

Starting at the end, negotiation is defined as the process of *constructing a pact* between the parties. To begin with, a distinction has to be made between *sides* and *parties*. A side is the spectrum of actors, collective and individual, who are implicated in the rebel and government elements of the conflict, whereas a "party" refers to the groups or individuals representing the sides and engaged in the negotiations. Not all parties on either side will be involved in the negotiations, only those accepted by each side as partners in a future pact. The pact is an agreement to cooperate in the

establishment of future relations and the handling (management or resolution) of the conflict. It sets out the terms of that management or resolution, but it also engages the parties to cooperate together in a new political relationship. As such it includes and also excludes, in two major decisions. The pact recognizes and legitimizes the parties involved, each acknowledging the other's status as representative of its side. It also codifies a decision in regard to spoilers, whether they should be included at the cost of substantive difficulty or excluded at the cost of procedural difficulty. Finally, the pact codifies substantive decisions on the content of the agreement and the issues of the conflict it covers.

References to well known situations illustrate these questions. A most interesting case is the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan. The natural and accepted representative of the South was the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), but who was the representative of the North was actually more significant. It could have been either the government or governing party, the Sudanese National Congress (SNC), that



Source: Dreamstime.com

A soldier of the Sudan People's Liberation Army. The SPLA is a predominantly Christian Sudanese rebel movement based in southern Sudan; its political wing is now represented in the government of Sudan.

held power in the North, or the opposition parties that most observers agree represent the majority of the Northern population, or both. A pact with the opposition parties had already been tried, in the Koka Dam agreement of 1995, which made no major impact on the conflict. So it was the government, to the exclusion of the majoritarian parties, that made the pact with the SPLA/M, letting the latter into a joint government, excluding the other parties, and strengthening the SNC for the upcoming elections.

At Oslo in 1993, the Israeli government chose to recognize and make a pact with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), to the exclusion of and against Hamas; the Oslo Agreement gave birth to the Palestine Authority (PA) governing an autonomous Palestinian area. After the 2006 election that brought Hamas to power, some movement was begun to renegotiate a new and fuller pact between the PLO/PA and Israel, again to the exclusion of Hamas.

Negotiations in South Africa in the early 1990s were dominated as much by the question of who was making the transitional pact out of apartheid as by the contents of the pact itself. Although the Conference for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) and its successor, the Multi-Party Conference, were ostensibly multilateral meetings of all political parties, they were in fact bilateral pacting sessions between the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party (NP), operating under but not involving the NP-dominated government; to come to fruition at the end, this bilateral pact was opened slightly to include the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).

In Rwanda in 1993, the overarching question in the negotiations between the Rwandan People's Front (RPF), the Rwandan National Movement for Development (MRND), and the opposition parties was whether the racist and ultimately *génocidaire* Coalition for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) would be included or not. The final pact between the three groups was not wholeheartedly accepted by any of them and was destroyed by the excluded spoilers, who would doubtless have made any agreement impossible if included.

In each of these cases, and many others, negotiations were dominated by a choice of pacting partner and an exclusion of others, with the choice of parties to the pact determining its substantive contents. It would be silly to discount the intricate ne-



Source: Wikipedia

Election rally in Ramallah organized by Hamas. A Palestinian Islamic socio-political organization which includes a paramilitary force, Hamas has always been excluded from negotiations over Palestine.

gotiations that went on over the substance of the emerging agreement, but what was negotiated was determined by who negotiated it.

Thus the guest list does not merely characterize the signatories of a pact; it also determines its formula for agreement.

In Sudan, the inclusion of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) meant that a secular state with religious freedom in at least southern Sudan would be the outcome, but the selection of the Sudanese National Congress (SNC) Party as the partner meant that the SPLA/M would be brought *into* a government where the SNC held critical elements of power, including control of the election process in the North.

The basis of the Oslo Agreement was the mutual recognition of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), one as a state and the other as the movement representative of its people—an unequal status that was reflected in all the provisions of the agreement.

In South Africa, the two leading parties were recognized as the parties sharing power in the transitional government that would institute free and fair elections and majority rule.

In Rwanda, the selection of the parties, even without the CDR, determined an agreement that none could live with and where the MRND's adherence was never

fully confirmed. In all these cases, the inclusion of the parties to the pact determined its basic formula, rather than the reverse.

Thus, it is the process of *selecting the parties* that is the major focus of the negotiations. There is also a temporal element in this contest. In the course of the rebellion, when the petition phase fails, it is followed by a consolidation phase in the conflict (Zartman 1995a). Within the rebel side, factions evolve and turn to a contest among themselves for leadership and representation of their reference group. This contest tends to be more violent than the conflict with the government itself, and its outcome determines the strategy and tactics that the rebels will adopt when they do turn their guns on the government. Although this contest determines who will eventually negotiate for the rebel cause and with the government, it puts those negotiations on hold until leadership is decided. Even afterward, it can continue to pose problems for substantive negotiations in the form of spoilers and single-shooters if the selection process for leadership is not conclusive or if the tactic represented by the winning leadership faction flags. In this phase negotiation is counterproductive and even subversive to consolidation, and parties who would try to negotiate the conflict before the leadership contest is decided will find themselves in danger. Selection of a spokesman is dependent on the outcome

of the consolidation phase of the rebellion, although it can also influence it, one way or another. Meanwhile, the substantive negotiation process may have to wait until the selection of parties is accomplished.

But the temporal element is not over. As negotiations proceed and the possibility of payoffs for participation become apparent, the number of parties proliferates. Break-away groups adopt a single-shooting strategy, hoping to gather the goodies of an agreement for themselves, or else a buy-in strategy in which they seek to share some of the collective benefits. Left out, they become spoilers—tactical spoilers, in Stedman's (2000) term—holding out until they can eke out the last drop of power from their position (Shapley and Shubik, 1954).

How then is selection accomplished? Within the rebellion, factional leadership will be negotiated by two criteria: the physical strength of the various factions and the proposed tactics' appeal to their referent group. The first indicates that the contest for leadership will be an active political, and soon violent, conflict among the factions, as noted. Intimidation, group battles and, more often, assassination of individuals are characteristic. The second is less direct and empirical evidence is often hard to find, both for the analyst and the participants, making it more uncertain and prolonged. Putative leaders have to prove that they accurately represent the tenor of opinion within the group they propose to represent; this is indeed the material of any political campaign, but there is no scheduled election to confirm the decision: it is a campaign without a formal ending. On the government side, there are similarities, but big differences. Assassination and pitched battle generally do not take place, and the campaign is generally ended by a formal selection of government spokespersons. However, interagency and intra-leadership conflicts may well continue after formal selection has been accomplished.

Negotiating selection is indicated by ripeness theory as well. In addition to the two substantive elements of ripeness, mutually hurting stalemate and way out, the need has often been emphasized for a third, procedural element, the presence of a valid spokesperson (Zartman, 1989). Although necessary, the first two are insufficient if there is no representative and authoritative party to speak for its side, feel the existence of the other two subjective elements, and undertake to negotiate as a result.

In this entire process of selection by negotiation, the relation between the procedural (selection) and substantive negotiations has to be kept in mind by the participants as well as by the analysts. Selection negotiations determine the scope of substantive negotiations, and the intended Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) of substantive negotiations determines the range of selectable parties. However, at the same time, the internal dynamics within each side also influence the range of selectable parties and the ultimate selection process. The first prize for pacting purposes is to do deals with core identity groups; the second prize, however, is to do the same with meaningful breakaway or softer identity groups. The first option may produce meaningful partners; the second weakens the opposition in terms of backing but has the risk of hardening it and pushing it to more radical action. This may of course suit those who seek to vilify it as evil. At best it may produce a fragile peace subject to ongoing attacks and also raise the question of who defines spoilers. Spoilers for radical elements are those who enter pacts and erode group solidarity; for the peacemakers they are the ideological recalcitrants. At some point the softliners might have to become tougher than the hardliners in the interests of the larger whole.

There are many examples to illustrate this process. Consolidation is the normal

process in any revolt, illustrated among others by the internecine battles among the Algerian nationalists in the 1950s, the Angolan nationalists in the 1960s that lasted out the century, the Eritrean nationalists in the 1960s, the Tamil nationalists in the 1970s, and the Sahrawi nationalists in the 1970s, putting off negotiations until the movement had achieved a dominant voice. Preparation and maturation for negotiations was a major problem for Renamo in Mozambique throughout the 1980s, for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone in the 1980s and 1990s, and for the National Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia, further delaying substantive negotiations until the rebel organizations were consolidated and then trained to negotiate, not always with success. Proliferation bedeviled the rebel movements in Liberia in the 1990s, the Burundian rebels in the 2000s, the Southern Sudanese rebels during the War of Zairian Succession in the 1990s, among others. The Darfur rebels in the 2000s never did consolidate, and their negotiations were plagued by maturation and proliferation problems throughout the early 2000s. In Colombia, in the mid-1980s when the government offered a normalization process for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the movement underwent a "soft split," the moderates forming the Patriotic Union (UP) with the



Source: Wikipedia

A school in Koindu damaged during the Sierra Leone Civil War by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel forces. The Sierra Leone Civil War began in 1991. Tens of thousands died and more than 2 million people (well over one-third of the population) were displaced during the 11-year conflict.



Source: <http://4.bp.blogspot.com>

Alfonso Cano is the main leader of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. FARC leaders are listed as some of the most wanted terrorists in the world according to Colombia's Administrative Department of Security.

skeptical assent of the radical wing. Success of the opening was cut short by the assassination of most of its leaders by right-wing paramilitaries. In the PLO, the attempted opening in the 1970s met a similarly violent end but from the radical core of the Organization, who assassinated moderate leaders open to contacts with Israel. At the present time, a double consolidation contest is going on in Palestine, first between Fatah and Hamas, over who is the true representative of the Palestinian people and their aspirations, and then within Hamas itself between the secular and religious wings.

More developed negotiation processes of selection occurred in other conflicts. In 1998 U.S. mediators made contacts with various factions in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in an effort to seize the moment when negotiations with Serbia appeared possible. The attempts ended up in the constitution of a heterogeneous delegation to formal negotiations at Rambouillet, although earlier chances of productive contacts that might have foreclosed a Serbian offensive were missed. In the Oslo talks the two sides actually negotiated appropriate representatives from either side. Preceding Oslo, Israel sought informal contacts with the PLO in the shadow of the stalled Madrid/Washington talks. The Oslo talks themselves began with discussions between private Israelis and authorized PLO

officials, after Israel had tested the official status of the Palestinians by requiring them to produce a procedural change in the behavior of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Washington talks. After five rounds of talks, the PLO delegation told the private Israelis that they would continue no further until they could talk with Israeli officials, which produced the arrival of Uri Savir and then Joel Singer as official representatives.

In Northern Ireland, the British held secret talks with Sinn Fein/IRA representatives as the Belfast process began to take shape, gradually bringing in appropriate Republican spokespersons, a process that continued all the way until the Good Friday Agreement, when Sinn Fein was excluded on two occasions as punishment for infringing the Mitchell Principles and then let back in to continue the talks. In South Africa, business people and even official representatives of the government began contacts with African National Congress (ANC) leaders as early as the mid-1980s, finally shaping the terms of a formula—non-violence in exchange for legality—that was the basis for the release of Nelson Mandela, the unbanning of the ANC, and the beginning of the negotiations (Zartman 1995b). These are just some salient and condensed examples of the long and delicate process of negotiation over spokespersons that precedes

and determines the subsequent substantive negotiation process, overshadowing it in importance. The South Africa lesson was the number of levels of pacting which took place up and down and across society to stabilize the political deal-making process and create a groundswell of momentum for the final outcome, breaking down rigid stereotypes at all levels in society, not just a simple reliance on political deal making.

In sum, in order to analyze negotiations in internal conflicts so characteristic of the current era and perhaps others as well, it is worthwhile considering a new approach to the negotiation process, focusing not on the usual subject of substantive determination of outcomes, but on negotiations to select negotiating parties out of the conflicting sides, and even appropriate spokespersons for these parties. Once that selection is negotiated, within but also between the sides, the outlines of the ensuing agreement have already been designed, opening up the process for a final agreement as a pact between parties in the name of sides. Negotiation analysis needs to develop a focus on the "who" of negotiations, which has been neglected in favor of the "what" (outcome) and "when" (timing), and yet which may well predominate over and determine the other two.

I. William Zartman

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Call for Papers—Summer Workshop 2010

Dealing with deadlocks: Managing negotiation meltdowns

Editors: Mark Anstey, Fen Osler Hampson, I. William Zartman

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The international community is in a regulatory crisis on several fronts in the face of global economic instability, environmental change, and the management of social problems that are the direct consequence of these.

Differences exist over objectives, appropriate methodologies, the distribution of costs, roles, and responsibilities, degrees of state and international intervention, and the structure and composition of bodies established to negotiate on such matters. The issues are clearly international; states cannot go it alone on matters of a global economy, a shared environment, or humanitarian crises arising from changing economic, climatic or political changes.

The problems have been recognized. The international community has met regularly in numerous forums to respond to them. But progress has been difficult, punctuated with breakdowns in talks at critical junctures. On the economic front international forums are struggling with issues of regulation, international trade and protectionism, the structure of international bodies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. On the environmental front cutbacks in emissions, global warming, and climate change impact nations differently, and changing conditions are having a powerful effect on population migration, access to food and water, health and the provision of health services within and across nations. At a political level, the stability of social accords in developed nations and the struggle to achieve stability in many developing nations is at risk. The pressures induced by responses to economic, environmental, and social problems are inescapable.

Breakdowns occur for many reasons: problems with the supply, accuracy, and use of information; insufficient preparatory work; poorly assembled bargaining tables; poor problem definition; poor understanding of the stakes involved across the spread of interests represented around a table and of those not at a table; inappropriate trade-offs; blocking to achieve leverage on issues at other bargaining tables; incapacity to deliver on the part of some parties...

PIN is calling for papers with a focus on breakdowns in negotiation over economic and environmental crises, and threats to political systems (international and national) as a consequence of these. Papers should concentrate primarily either on an analysis of the regime meltdown, on the nature of negotiation deadlocks, or on strategies for overcoming them.

This is a call for proposals to be sent to Ariel Macaspac, Program Administrator, PIN Program, IIASA: macaspac@iiasa.ac.at by 30 January 2010. Accepted proposals will be notified immediately and draft papers are due on 15 May 2010. The papers will be presented at a conference at IIASA on 18–19 June 2010 and papers revised for publication will be due on 1 October 2010.

Arms Control and Disarmament Verification: Deterrence through Leadership

Introduction

In most international Arms Control and Disarmament (ACD) agreements, verification of the agreement's provisions plays a central role. While the general understanding is that the objective of verification is to deter the parties involved from illegal actions (in the sense of the agreement), it is not obvious at all under what conditions deterrence actually works and if these conditions can be guaranteed with the means provided by a verification system.

Furthermore, a verification system, once accepted by the parties to the ACD agreement, is not a mechanism that functions automatically; instead it leaves ample room for negotiation between the verification authority and the parties to the agreement. Take, for example, the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT): On-Site Inspections (OSIs) are an important tool within its verification regime, but before such an OSI can be performed, serious negotiations must take place between the state parties involved and the Executive Council of the CTBT Organization (2005).

Following a discussion in PIN's current project on CTBT negotiations we will show, with the help of a simplified game theoretical model, how deterrence can be quantified and how it can be achieved.

Quantitative model

Let us assume that the verification agency (the first player or "Inspector") of an ACD agreement plans an inspection of a site within a state party to the agreement (the second player or "Inspectee"), for example, a test site or a military facility. Assume further that the Inspector has no prior knowledge of any kind, but that he/she will find out with certainty whether or not the latter has behaved legally.¹

Thus, the Inspector has two possibilities (pure strategies), namely, to inspect or not to inspect, and the Inspectee also has two possibilities (pure strategies), namely, to behave legally or to violate the agreement. The payoffs to the two players are given as the two components of the following vectors:

- $(0,0)$ for legal behavior of the Inspectee and no inspection
- $(-e,0)$ for legal behavior of the Inspectee and inspection
- $(-c,d)$ for illegal behavior of the Inspectee and no inspection
- $(-a,-b)$ for illegal behavior of the Inspectee and inspection.

Let us explain these payoffs. First of all, we normalize them by saying that, in the case of legal behavior and no inspection, both players get nothing. The quantity e represents the inspection costs, and the quantity a the loss to the Inspector in the case of illegal behavior on the part of the Inspectee and inspection. The worst outcome for the Inspector is undetected illegal behavior c . The

¹ A good example is provided by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Here, random inspections of military sites are performed to verify whether or not the actual number of so-called Treaty Limited Items corresponds to that reported. The CTBT is not as good an example; here, OSIs are performed only after certain (e.g., seismic) events have been observed. Moreover, whether or not the state behaved legally cannot be decided under all circumstances. We will come back to this case.

		Inspectee	
		1 - t	t
Inspector	β	Legal	Illegal
	1 - β	No inspection	Inspection
		(0, 0)	(-c, +d)
		(-e, 0)	(-a, -b)

Figure 1: Normal form of the inspection game. The numbers on the left-hand side in the brackets are the payoffs to player 1 (Inspector), the numbers on the right-hand side are those to player 2 (Inspectee). The arrows indicate the incentive directions for both players.

Inspectee's payoffs are positive for undetected illegal action d , and negative for detected illegal action b . We assume

$$0 < e < a < c, 0 < b, 0 < d.$$

Let us consider a first variant of this rather general game theoretical model: both players decide independently which strategy to use. This variant is formulated best as a so-called non-cooperative two-person game in normal form, see Figure 1.

The solution of a non-cooperative two-person game is given quite generally by the so-called Nash (1951) equilibrium, which is defined as a pair of strategies with the property that any unilateral deviation from that pair of strategies does not improve the deviator's payoff.²

As the preference directions in our game, see Figure 1, are circular, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Therefore, we have to consider mixed strategies: let β be the probability not to inspect, and t the probability to behave illegally. Then it can be shown easily (Avenhaus and Canty, 1996) that the equilibrium strategies and payoffs of both players are

$$\beta^* = \frac{b}{b+d}, \quad t^* = \frac{e}{e+c-a},$$

$$I_1^* = -e \frac{c}{e+c-a}, \quad I_2^* = 0.$$

Most importantly, we see that the Inspectee will behave illegally with positive probability (even though his payoff is the same as in the case of legal behavior!) which means, in plain language, that under these circumstances the Inspector is simply not able to deter the Inspectee from illegal behavior.

² In general a Nash equilibrium need not be unique. In that case an equilibrium selection problem arises that may require more refined modelling. In both variants of our model, however, the Nash equilibrium is unique.




Figure 2: Extensive form of the inspector leadership game. OSI and \overline{OSI} denote inspection and no inspection, respectively. The payoffs to the two players are given as vectors below the end nodes, where the upper component belongs to the Inspector and the lower one to the Inspectee.

Therefore, we consider now a second variant of our general model: we assume that the Inspector announces his strategy to the Inspectee in a credible way. This behavior is referred to as the *leadership principle* and was introduced into economic theory by von Stackelberg (1934). Today it is applied by economists in the framework of so-called principal agent theory.

The appropriate graphical representation of this variant is the extensive form, see Figure 2.

The Inspector begins by choosing the inspection probability $1 - \beta$ and then announces it to the Inspectee. The latter then decides whether or not to behave legally. As he knows the probability β for the inspection, his strategy is now a prescription t to behave legally ($t=0$) or not ($t=1$) for any value of β . Then Signal finally decides if the inspection actually takes place. The payoffs for each possible outcome are shown at the bottom of the figure.

Again it can be shown that the equilibrium strategies and payoffs of both players are:

$$\beta^* = \frac{b}{b+d}, \quad t^*(\beta) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{for } \beta \leq \beta^* \\ 1 & \text{for } \beta > \beta^* \end{cases},$$

$$I_1^* = I_2^* = 0.$$

We see that the equilibrium strategy β of the Inspector is the same as before. For β the equilibrium strategy of the Inspectee is indeed legal behavior, in contrast to that of the first variant.

Discussion

Based on the results of our quantitative analysis we can now answer the two questions concerning deterrence which we raised initially. First we make the definition that a party to an ACD agreement is deterred from illegal behavior if, in a non-cooperative game modeling the conflict situation between the state and the verification authority, the equilibrium strategy of the inspected state is legal behavior. Second, we have seen that the inspector leadership principle does indeed lead to exactly this equilibrium strategy on the part of the inspected party.

One might raise the question as to why an inspection should be performed, even though the Inspector knows that the Inspectee is behaving legally. The answer is that it is only because the Inspector announces his inspection probability in a *credible* way (and therefore has to perform the inspection if Signal permits that the legal behavior equilibrium is established).

It should be mentioned here that, as stated initially, OSIs in the context of CTBT verification cannot be described with the help of the simple model presented here. The inspector leadership principle, however, works for OSIs as well in the sense that the equilibrium strategy of the inspected state is legal behavior.

What is the practical relevance of these theoretical considerations? In a PIN project on formal models and international negotiations, the results of which have been published recently (Avenhaus and Zartman, 2007), formal models are classified into those *of*, *in*, and *for* international negotiations. Obviously, the models presented here belong to the third category. Let us quote p. 231:

On the one hand, and contrary to the models of negotiations, they provide very special advice on solving a concrete negotiation problem; on the other hand, they do not take into account the more subtle procedural or structural aspects. A fair division solution, for example, if accepted by the parties, eliminates any kind of negotiation. Thus, in reality, models of this type may serve as guidelines at the beginning of or at some point during the negotiations without claiming that they can solve the negotiation problem immediately.

The two variants of our general model fit precisely into this definition. If our assumptions were fulfilled and if the payoff parameters were known, then everyone would know that the states parties to the ACD agreement would behave legally. Of course reality is not that simple, and ample room remains for conflicts and disputes, quite in the sense of our definition of models *for* negotiations.

On the other hand, all will agree that the decision for or against an inspection needs a rational basis. Verification: How much is enough? (Krass, 1985) is a book that has still not lost its relevance. In the interest of a healthy dialog between theorists and practitioners we would appreciate it if practitioners would show an interest in quantitative models of verification and put questions to the theorists which then either could be answered immediately or at least stimulate further investigations of this kind.

Rudolf Avenhaus, Morton Canty, and Thomas Krieger

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Putting On-site Inspections on the Table: Tabletop Exercises as Means of Negotiations Training for Inspectors

While on-site inspections carried out by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO) depend for their effectiveness on the willingness of states to comply with them, the way an on-site inspection is implemented is just as important. Under the CTBT on-site inspection regime, an inspection team of 40 inspectors can be sent to investigate an area of up to 1,000 sq km to clarify whether a nuclear explosion has or has not taken place. Inspectors need both human and technical resources to find out whether the CTBT has been violated; however, from the human resources viewpoint, one of the most important skills that team members can have at their disposal during the on-site inspection process are bargaining skills.

After the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for CTBT, and as the CTBT on-site inspection regime started to be studied and exercised, it became apparent that negotiations were going to have to be conducted on a daily basis as well as at different levels between the personnel of an inspection team and an inspected state party. While the main criterion for selecting experts for an inspection team is their scientific expertise, it became clear that inspectors should also be trained in the use of negotiation techniques.

The CTBT, in contrast with other organizations with an ongoing routine inspections regime, does not have an in-house (employed) inspectorate that can be called in for training at any time. As training in negotiation skills is best conducted interactively, special tabletop exercises, including a few case studies simulating on-site inspection negotiations, were run to allow on-site inspection team members to study and experience the negotiation environment and strategy laid down under the CTBT.

The method and technique used for the tabletop exercise came from the military—armies find it useful to conduct such exercises using maps and against a simulated enemy, as it obviates the need to mobilize battalions or actually enter enemy territory. The CTBT on-site inspection activity in many ways has the characteristics of a military exercise, and the idea of using tabletop exercises was a natural progression of this. Indeed, the United States and Soviet Union conducted bilateral tabletop exercises before the CTBT was concluded to study the modalities of the process and the problems inherent to it. The CTBTO has used tabletop

exercises over the years both in the office and out in the field.

The use of maps as a focal point in tabletop exercises is what distinguishes them from diplomatic role play. A fundamental difference between the two is the reality factor. Tabletop exercises try to get as close to reality as possible, but use a “fantasy” map to avoid political problems. In that sense tabletop exercises come close to “geofiction”: a simulation exercise in a non-existent geographical framework. Geofiction is not too concerned about reality, as it is trying to cater for creativity rather than technical experimentation. Having said that, technical aspects remain important options that need to be discussed in the case of a stand-off.

In tabletop exercises the preferred option is to have relatively strong opposing views and hardly any middle ground. This is not only closer to reality but a test under extreme circumstances is also more useful to trainees than a moderate laboratory situation. A scenario-based tabletop exercise environment is the most effective way, aside from an actual field exercise, of preparing participants for an on-site inspection process.

The exercise scenario is provided in two separate parts: one for the inspection team and one for the inspected state party. The latter includes details—known only to the inspected state party—that would influence the conduct of the operation and the cooperation of the inspected state party with the inspection team. All official background documentation, including relevant maps, is attached to the scenario, along with a series of case studies and special tasks to be played out during the exercise.

Negotiation on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

In the mid-1990s, the scientific community played a major role in the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In June 2009 the community of negotiation analysts collaborated in a new analytical endeavor—a workshop to evaluate the negotiations to establish and implement the prohibition and verification regime. The results of the studies are planned to be the basis of a new book directed at the CTBTO and concerned states, to be used as a basis for policy considerations.

Special events, such as weather reports, accidents, equipment failures, etc., and data to represent information collected during negotiation are also injected into the main flow of the scenario as the need arises.

Tabletop exercise at IIASA

The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria, was the venue in June 2008 for a special tabletop exercise on the occasion of a meeting to discuss a forthcoming book about the CTBTO.

The authors of the chapter on CTBTO problems on the ground presented their colleagues with their classic tabletop exercise and ran it with them. This was a special moment in the meeting, where all participants were suddenly drawn into interacting, which also helped to create an even more cooperative atmosphere.



Table-top exercise at IIASA

The conference members were divided into two delegations, one representing the inspection team, the other the inspected state party. Instructions were given both to the teams and to the individual delegation members. Both parties had a team leader plus a number of "experts," while the chapter authors acted as game masters and observers. After 45 minutes of preparation, including internal negotiations—during which the already-heated internal debates took place, notably in the inspection team—external negotiations lasted for another 45 minutes, followed by 45 minutes' debriefing and discussions. In the actual negotiation process, the two teams of 12 people each declared their positions and demands and exchanged arguments and exhibits. This bilateral process of negotiation could be characterized as quite distributive, like haggling at the market place, but using diplomatic terminology.

It was a polarized and tense exchange of views, even emotional now and then—the inspection team being short of time, the inspected state party buying time. The heads of delegation were chosen by the game masters for their experience and knowledge. Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of The Netherlands, having been the last chair of the Test-Ban Treaty Negotiations in Geneva in 1996, headed the inspected state party team. Rebecca Johnson, director of the United Kingdom's Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, opposed him as head of delegation of the CTBTO inspection team—two different temperaments with equal subject knowledge and negotiation skill. A very intriguing, and probably extremely realistic, process unfolded, which was a learning experience for participants and observers and for the game masters.

Although the teams were asked to avoid procedural discussions and to focus on the subject matter as much as possible, more than half the negotiation time was lost because of a prolonged procedural struggle. A "fight" over what was or was not allowed during the upcoming inspection period dominated the first half of the negotiation and bedeviled the second half. This was not coincidental; everybody recognized it as a strategy on the part of the inspected state party. Indeed, the flow of the bargaining process clearly showed that it was extremely difficult for the inspection team to break through the defenses of the inspected state party. Clearly, the rules and regulations of the CTBTO and its Manual, yet to be finalized, give the high ground to the state that is to be inspected. It is quite easy for the inspected state party to use procedural issues to postpone discussions on content.

This avoidance strategy provoked escalation which did not really foster an integrative bargaining process. While the inspected state party had a pulling strategy from the start, the inspection team, because of its time problem, had no choice but to implement a pushing approach. In this situation it was more difficult for the party on the "offensive" to stay balanced than for the party on the "defensive." Positional bargaining characterized the process, although some useful integrative aspects were added in the second half of the interaction by a group of experts from both parties which reached an agreement on a few important issues during their break-out session. Being experts and not too bothered by the political process unfolding between the two teams, it was not too difficult for them to bridge some of the rifts. Obviously the back-channel negotiations did not suffer from the loss-of-face problems with which the delegations in the "plenary" were confronted. However, even these positive results forged by the expert group were unable (yet) to turn the negotiation process into a problem-solving one. Slowly but surely, the issue-specific power of the inspection team shifted to the inspected state party, and there were no substantive results at the end of the bargaining process.

The lesson of this exercise was that the rules and regulations of CTBTO do not—at least not in the context of the tabletop exercise—allow enough space for the inspection team to successfully negotiate on-site inspection with the inspected state party.

*Paul Meerts and
Mordechai (Moti) Melamud*

For more information:

CTBTO: <http://www.ctbto.org/>

On-site inspections: <http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/on-site-inspection/the-final-verification-measure/page-1/>
IIASA: <http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/PIN/docs/CTBTworkshop2009.html>

1996 Test-Ban Treaty Negotiations in Geneva in 1996

<http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/developments-after-1996/interviewjaap-ramakerchairman-of-the-ctbt-negotiations-in-1996/ramaker-1/>

Acronym UK <http://www.acronym.org.uk/>



Source: www.ctbto.org

The Treaty: Jaap Ramaker (front left) at the 2007 Article XIV Conference in the Hofburg Palace, Vienna.

Development of Negotiation Guidelines for the CTBT–OSI Inspection Team: Cooperation with the PIN Program



Source: www.ctbto.org

An Inspection Team meeting during the Integrated Field Exercise IFE08 in Kazakhstan. One of the most important skills that team members can have at their disposal during the on-site inspection process are bargaining skills.

As the on-site inspection regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO) was developed, it became evident that all inspectors would need to be trained in the basics of negotiation processes. However, a systematic approach is necessary to provide CTBTO inspectors with negotiation tools and training methods that are relevant to their specific tasks.

It is clear that the inspection team leader needs to be a capable negotiator. However, he or she will have to rely on the scientific expertise of his team members and also to delegate some of the negotiation process to them. For example, he will need to engage them in technical discussions with inspected state party experts to look for alternative approaches to problems, as these arise, and thus facilitate inspection activities under the Treaty.

The inspectors also have to appreciate that their highest priority task is to gather relevant data and not to spend time on unproductive legal negotiations with the in-

spected state party. If they are not satisfied with the response of the inspected state party, they have the option of recording the issue in the inspection report. Cultural differences and the need for interpretation may strongly affect the communication within the inspection team and between the inspection team and the inspected state party. As misunderstandings may arise, these need to be studied and considered as part of the inspection plan prepared for the team before it leaves for the inspection.

The inspection team needs to be provided with a generic, structured negotiation model that can be adapted to different possible negotiation contexts and situations, depending on the case. This generic process needs to be formalized as a Standard Operations Procedure to be used for the actual training of inspectors and for use during the inspections themselves. A detailed analysis and study of the specific parameters for the negotiation regime of CTBT on-site inspection teams is therefore

needed. This will allow conclusions to be drawn on basic principles, as well as guidelines to be created for the inspection team that can be used for training of inspectors and for conducting actual inspections.

A special expert meeting is planned for the study and definition of the required guidelines and generic negotiation method, as described above. The expert group will consist of theoreticians and practitioners in negotiations, and will include negotiation experts from the PIN Program and elsewhere, and on-site inspection experts. A three-day meeting will be organized by the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBTO (on-site inspection training section) together with the on-site inspection training section of CTBTO. It will be conducted in or around Vienna and is tentatively planned for 14–16 June 2010.

Dr. Mordechai (Moti) Melamud
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PIN Interactive: The North–South Divide in the Climate Change Negotiations

What is PIN Interactive?

PIN aims to reach out to the readers of PINPoints magazine through an interactive platform. PIN offers for discussion an article on any issue related to negotiation, which can be discussed by readers. In the next PinPoints issue, selected responses of readers (max. 100 words each) will be published. The author of this article will be given the chance to comment on the responses.

Responses can be sent by e-mail (pin@iiasa.ac.at) or regular mail to PIN, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Schlossplatz 1, A-2361, Austria

The climate change negotiations seem to have resuscitated the North–South divide in the international system, which had come to be regarded as somewhat outdated (Nigel, 1986; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Hoogvelt, 1997).

The North–South divide is the socioeconomic and political division that exists between developed (“North”) and developing (“South”) countries (see Hayes and Smith, 1993; Zartman, 1987; White 1993). It represents the development gap between countries as described by the Human Development Index (HDI) and exemplified by Walter Rostow’s (2000) model of development

This article highlights the problematic situation brought about by the social evolutionary feature of this model, which paves the way for the assumption that the North “invented” development and that the South should follow the same path. The experiences of the North are supposed to serve as a yardstick when developmental policies are formulated, which implies that there is a need to assert “development principles” determined by the North. This article argues that development can be removed from its “Eurocentric” connotation and rather conceptualized in a contextual manner in which cultural and local specificities are considered.

The North–South Divide and the contesting notions of justice and fairness

The North–South divide has gained relevance in the climate change negotiations through the contesting notions of justice and fairness, which can also be found in other areas such as trade and global

economics. The boundary between the North and the South has been determined by positions about who should shoulder the costs of confronting climate change, both mitigation and adaptation measures. On the one hand, the North pursues a “forward-looking” notion of justice and fairness. Present generations should not be punished for “crimes” they did not commit and “crimes” that were not crimes when the actions in question were carried out by earlier generations (Caney, 2009). It would be unfair if present and future generations had to carry the costs of coping with climate change. It is perceived to be unfair that mandatory cuts would be required by developed countries and not by major emitters in the developing world such as India, China, and Brazil, which is the case under the Kyoto Protocol. Developing countries should adopt substantial mitigation targets of their own.

In contrast, the South follows a “backward-looking” notion of justice and fairness, according to which present generations in developed countries have benefited from the decisions and actions of their ancestors and therefore should carry the associated costs of climate change (La Viña, 1997; Muller, 2009). Furthermore, the North “owes” the South the environmental space it has contaminated (Muller, 2009); therefore, there should be a scheme of compensation for the developing countries. As La Viña (1997) notes, historical data show that industrialized countries of the North have utilized more than half of the world’s fossil fuels over the past 120 years. Many developing countries still find it unacceptable that traditional agricultural practices are blamed for increased methane emissions. These practices support the subsistence of billions of



Source: <http://www.sxc.hu/home>

Industrialized countries of the North have utilized more than half of the world's fossil fuels over the past 120 years.



Source: <http://www.sxc.hu/home>

Traditional agricultural practices should be distinguished from energy-wasteful agriculture, animal husbandry, and industry in the North... which contribute substantially to methane emissions.

people. They should be distinguished from energy-wasteful agriculture, animal husbandry, and industry in the North, which reflect "luxurious needs" and also contribute substantially to methane emissions.

Technology transfers and other developmental measures should not be based on goodwill, but should rather be commitments of the North to the South as com-

penation for the historical atrocities to the environment. It is furthermore demanded by the South that climate change assistance should not compete with the conventional developmental assistance provided to industrialized countries, especially the least-developed countries (LDCs). Funds provided for mitigation and adaptation should not be acquired from existing devel-

opmental aid because this will lead to even greater distributional unfairness.

However, it is important to find where the boundaries of such commitments would be in order to avoid a "blank check" situation. The question of the justice and fairness of the burdens of global warming has been described as a "tricky one practically, philosophically, and politically" (Grubb et al, 1992). Justice and fairness refer to the apportioning of costs of adaptation, mitigation and/or compensation which are contentious in developed as well as in developing countries.

The North–South Divide: An opportunity or a stumbling block?

Because of the complexity of the climate change context, developing countries, which generally tend to be non-major players in international negotiations, have gained recognition and importance from the climate talks process. For instance, several developed countries have set the participation of developing countries, particularly those with emerging economies such as China, Brazil, and India, as a precondition for their own participation. This has paved the way for developing countries to become more important players in this context.

President George W. Bush announced during his term in office that the United States would not return to the climate change negotiation table unless developing countries had also formally accepted the same responsibilities as countries in the North. The U.S. Special Envoy on Climate Change, Ambassador Todd Stern (2009) argues, "China and the developing world's current emissions are tomorrow's historic responsibility," and notes that developing nations are on track to produce more than 80 percent of the growth in carbon emissions during the next several decades. Thus, excluding developing countries from climate talks has become a non-option.

This situation gives developing countries power not only to formulate the agenda for the climate talks but also to influence the negotiation process. The empowerment of developing countries was partially gained through the organizational settings available in the international system for the climate talks. As early as 1972 the UN Conference on the Human Environment

in Stockholm expressed the need to formulate environmental policies that would not hamper development. The United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 established a process for negotiating further measures favoring developing countries and introduced mechanisms for transferring finance and technology to the least developed countries (Cowie, 2007). The establishment of the "negotiation vehicle" called the Group of 77 in 1964 (with currently 133 member states) also contributed to increasing the negotiation capacity of developing countries.

The North–South divide in the climate change negotiation offers an opportunity to push forward the negotiation process. Opportunity lies in the possibility of finding a more sustainable solution to the common problem because of the wider degree of participation, which would otherwise not be possible. The divide was, for instance, a precondition for several organizational settings such as the Group of 77. The North–South divide represents one of the necessary "rooms of constructive debate" where interests hiding behind positions can be expressed. The North–South divide offers an

overview of the structural conditions in the international system, which governments should consider as their point of departure in negotiating their interests. For instance, the North–South divide enables the states to figure out which coalitions they should belong to. Then coalitions will really be established on the basis of common interests, which makes the negotiation process less uncertain. Without the North–South divide, it would be more difficult to understand why states are pursuing their claims and positions.

For more discussions about the climate change negotiations, please watch out for the upcoming PIN book: *Climate Change Negotiations—A Guide to Resolving Disputes and Facilitating Multilateral Cooperation* (Editors: Gunnar Sjöstedt and Ariel Macaspac Penetrante), forthcoming 2010, Earthscan Publications.

Ariel Macaspac Penetrante

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Participants in IIASA's 2009 Young Scientist Summer Program, as well as IIASA staff members, simulated the upcoming COP15 negotiations in Copenhagen. The participants learned that besides understanding the scientific context of climate change, there is a need to understand the processes involved in such negotiations. Participants, playing 28 countries, witnessed how coalitions based on their interests were established. Pressure groups such as NGOs were also played to put pressure on negotiators.

Dear Readers,

Do you agree with the arguments made by the author? Are there any important aspects in the North–South divide that he is missing? Do you agree that the North–South divide is an opportunity rather than a threat?

Please send your comments before 30 January 2010.

Negotiation Support Systems in the Context of Crisis Response Processes

Goran Mihelcic



"When written in Chinese, the word 'crisis' is composed of two characters. One represents danger and the other represents opportunity".

John F. Kennedy

During my participation in IIASA's 2009 Young Scientists Summer Program (YSSP), I had the opportunity to take a closer look at special types of decision support system in the context of crisis response processes (CRPs).

Decision support systems are a special type of information system, designed to support and improve decision-making processes in businesses and organizations.

The course and outcome of negotiation processes are heavily influenced by the continuous stream of decisions made by actors involved in negotiations. One of the main characteristics of CRPs is that they are concerned with continuous decision making. Depending on the type and severity of a crisis, a CRP will involve negotiations comprising actors or groups of actors who can further or hinder the overall response activities.

My research during YSSP 2009 was intended to provide an outlook and a basis for further research on how the integration of negotiation support systems (NSS) might be able to support CRPs by improving the negotiation processes between stakeholders involved in crisis response activities.

My hypotheses state that the use of NSSs, in any given context, can save time and money, which is crucial in a decision environment (crisis) where resources are restricted and time is of the essence.

Actors in these negotiations could typically be government agencies, nongov-

ernmental organizations (NGOs), federal agencies, and private-sector organizations. In addition to the companies that donate goods to support crisis management (and very often to reestablish their basis for doing business) there are many companies that are not directly affected and have a strong economic interest in participating in crisis response processes.

A closer look is taken at the potential use of NSS in the procedure for drawing up a disaster plan (process-oriented NSS): Who takes the lead? Who is in charge and responsible for what domain, region, or task? And furthermore, the involvement of NSS for resource acquisition (equipment, construction material, food, etc.) using partly autonomous auction systems (problem-oriented NSS) is analyzed.

The use of NSS could take crisis response a step further toward making use of the "opportunities" of a crisis, rather than solely managing its "dangers."

Working at the IIASA as a "YSSPer" was a very inspiring and interesting experience. Having had the chance to be part of IIASA's international community and the opportunity to learn from its experienced and gifted scientists, was also highly beneficial. I am especially grateful to my supervisors, Prof. Dr. Avenhaus and Prof. Dr. Casti, as well as the PIN Steering Committee. And last but not least, I want to cordially thank the organizational team for their excellent work that made YSSP 2009 such an unforgettable experience.

Goran graduated from the University of Cologne, Germany in 2006 with a diploma in Business Informatics. Since 2007 he has been working as a research assistant at the Department of Operations Research, University of the Federal Armed Forces in Munich, Germany. He is currently in the third year of a doctoral thesis that focuses on the development of decision support systems in the context of crisis response and critical infrastructure protection. His further research interests include service-oriented architectures, process management, and software engineering.

Mediation Strategies in Multiparty Mediation Process

What to do when there is a conflict of interests among the mediators?

Sinisa Vukovic



Sinisa received his BA in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Rome "La Sapienza" and MA in International Relations and Diplomacy from Leiden University (program offered jointly with the Netherlands Institute for International Relations, "Clingendael.") He is currently a first-year PhD student at Leiden University's Institute of Political Science. His research focuses on comparative analysis of multiparty mediation process. His research interests include international relations, conflict resolution, international mediation, international organizations, former Yugoslavia, post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction.

As a result of the popularity of mediation as a conflict management activity in international relations and the recent proliferation of potential mediators, so the interest of academia in analyzing the process and dynamics of multiparty mediation has gradually grown.

The concept refers to simultaneous interventions by more than one mediator in a conflict, interventions by composite actors such as contact groups, as well as se-

quential mediated interventions that again involve more than one party. The most important concepts for a successful multi-party mediation appear to be consistency in interests and cooperation and coordination between mediators. A general objective of this research was to explore the relevance and ways of achieving coordination (even) when there is no consistency in interests between various mediators, and thus surmount the problems that multiple mediators face when operating without a "common script" in attempting to mediate a dispute and move the parties toward a negotiated settlement.

Using case study analysis of recent mediation activities, the research explored what are the most effective mediation strategies in cases where the process is hampered by conflicting interests in the mediation coalition.



The Role of Private Actors in the Negotiations on a Reform of the Clean Development Mechanism

Emma Paulsson (now Lund)



The Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has been a success story in many ways, with thousands of emission-reducing projects being undertaken in developing countries generating a multibillion-dollar market. However, the mechanism has also received a lot of criticism. NGOs question the additionality of CDM projects, developing countries criticize their inequitable distribution, and the business community complains about the arduous administrative process around the CDM.

Over the last few years, a reform of the CDM has therefore been high on the

agenda. Compared to most international agreements, the CDM gives private actors a very active role, with companies both implementing and supervising the projects. These companies thus have real stakes in the further development of the CDM, which affect their role in the negotiations. In traditional models of multilateral negotiations, state actors play the leading roles, and the influence of non-state actors is largely overlooked. Given the active involvement of private companies in the CDM, the negotiations on how to reform this mechanism provide an interesting test to such state-centered models. How does the fact that private actors have such large stakes in the outcome of these negotiations affect the dynamics of the process?

Drawing on the empirical case of the reform of the CDM, this project investigated the characteristics of market actors in multilateral negotiations. Are private actors pursuing very specific market interests, or do their suggestions fall within the range of ideas presented by national parties? Through comparing the content of

statements and position papers from carbon market actors with similar documents originating from the national delegations, the characteristics of private actors were traced. These results were then discussed in the light of existing models of multilateral negotiations.

Emma graduated in 2006 from Lund University in Sweden. She holds a master's degree in Political Science, but also studied environmental science at undergraduate level. She is currently a third-year PhD student in political science at Lund University. In her dissertation project she explores the various roles that private companies take on in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in order to study empirically the concept of "governance beyond the state." Emma's main research interests are climate policy and the role of private actors in global governance.

Two Forthcoming PIN Books on Terrorism

The PIN Program is publishing two works on negotiation with terrorists: one focusing on political hostage negotiations and the other on negotiations with political terrorist organizations. The tables of contents are given below:

Negotiating with Terrorists: Strategy, Tactics, and Politics (Routledge 2009)

Edited by Guy Olivier Faure & I William Zartman

Introduction: Negotiating with Terrorists—Who Holds Whom Hostage?

Guy Olivier Faure, Sorbonne University, France, & I William Zartman, Johns Hopkins University, USA

I How to Negotiate: Kidnapping the Kidnappers

Introduction

1. Laurent Combalbert, GEOS, France, "Guidelines for Negotiators with Terrorists"
2. Alex Schmid and P. Flemming, St Andrews University, UK, "Quantitative and Qualitative Aspects of Kidnapping and Hostage Negotiation"
3. David Pinder, Bradford University, UK, "Talking to the Devil"

II Practical/Tactical: Freeing the Hostages

Introduction

4. Karen Feste, University of Denver, USA, "Terrorist Negotiating Strategy in Lebanon"
5. Adam Dolnik, University of Wollongong, Australia, "Negotiating in Beslan and Beyond"
6. Victor Kremenyuk, Iskan, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia, "Negotiating Visible and Hidden Agendas"
5. P Sahadevan, Jawharlal Nehru University, India. "Negotiating The Grand Swap in Khandahar"

III Conclusions

6. Guy Olivier Faure & I William Zartman, "Lessons for Practice"
7. Bibliography

Engaging Extremists: States and Terrorists Negotiating Ends and Means

Edited by I William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure

Introduction:

Why and Why Not Engage? I William Zartman, Johns Hopkins University, USA, & Guy Olivier Faure, Sorbonne University

I Changing Means and Ends

Introduction

1. I William Zartman, USA, & Maha Khan, Pakistan, Johns Hopkins University, "Negotiation in Terrorism's Life Cycle I: Growing Up in Groups"
2. William Donohue, Michigan State University, USA, "Negotiation in Terrorism's Life Cycle II: Growing Down in Organizations"
3. Camille Pecastaing, Johns Hopkins University, USA, "Reaching the Terrorist"

II Devising Strategy and Tactics

Introduction

4. Robert Lambert, University of Exeter, UK, "Community Intervention as an Engagement Strategy—al-Qaeda in London"
5. Carolin Goerzig, University of Munich, Germany, "Change through Debate: Gama'a Islamiya"
6. Kristine Höglund, Uppsala University, Sweden, "Tactics in Negotiations with Terrorists"
7. Maria Groeneveld-Savisaar and Sinisa Vukovic, Netherlands, "Terror, Muscle and Mediation: Failure of Multiparty mediation Efforts in Sri Lanka"
8. Stacie Pettyjohn, University of Virginia, USA, "Making Policy toward Terrorist Organizations: Isolate or Engage?"
9. Aldo Civico, Columbia University, USA "Colombia: Engaging the ELN"

III Conclusion

10. I William Zartman & Guy Olivier Faure. "When and How to Engage?"
11. Bibliography

PIN Policy Brief on Terrorism

IIASA Policy Brief



#06 • March 2009

The official line is that public authorities do not negotiate with terrorists. However, governments frequently do end up negotiating with hostage takers and kidnappers and with political groups classified as terrorists. Clearly there are negotiations and negotiations, just as there are terrorists and terrorists. While this briefing does not necessarily advocate negotiating with terrorists, it outlines the practicalities of such negotiations, providing a guide to deciding how, when, and with whom to negotiate.

Negotiating with Terrorists: A Mediator's Guide

Summary

- The main objection to negotiation with terrorists is that it encourages them to repeat their tactics. But it is not negotiation *per se* that encourages terrorism, rather the degree to which terrorists are able to achieve their demands by negotiation.
- There are different types of terrorists, according to their reasons and goals for using terrorism. *Contingent* terrorists, such as kidnappers and hostage takers, do seek negotiations. *Absolute* terrorists, such as suicide bombers, view *any* negotiation as a betrayal of their very *raison d'être*.
- Some absolute terrorists may become open to discussion and eventually moderation of their means and ultimately even of their ends. The challenge of negotiation is to move total absolutes into conditionals, and to work on contingent terrorists to either *reduce* or *change* their terms.
- Effective negotiations can begin when the parties perceive themselves to be in a mutually hurting stalemate and see a way out. Negotiators must maintain pressure (stalemate) while offering a way out, thereby showing terrorists there is something to gain from negotiation.
- Negotiators do not negotiate belief systems. They should help terrorists develop alternative *means*: changing terrorist *ends* can be tackled only over the much longer term.
- Negotiation with contingent terrorists is a short-term *tactic*; negotiation with absolute terrorists is a long-term *strategy*. Patience and persistence will prove key to dealing with both contingent and absolute terrorists.
- The negotiator needs to offer the conditional absolute terrorist concessions to his demands as the payment for abandoning his violent terrorism, not concessions to the pressure of terrorism itself. If the negotiator makes concessions to the terrorist part of the negotiation process, so too must the terrorist. Even the absolute terrorist organizer does have something to offer as payment—his choice of terrorist tactics.



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Renewing the PIN Steering Committee

Two longtime members of the PIN Steering Committee have retired, and six new members and associate members have joined.

Founding member **Dr Victor Kremenyuk**, Deputy Director of the US–Canada Institute of the Russian Academy of Science, has left the Steering Committee; he retains his interest in PIN matters as a member of the Russian National Member Organization (NMO). Dr Kremenyuk was the editor of PIN's flagship work, *International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches and Issues*, a comprehensive volume originally published in 1993 and in revised edition in 2003 by Jossey-Bass. He was also co-editor of four PIN books and contributor to a number of others. A political historian, he is a specialist in strategic studies and has published a number of other works, primarily in Russian.

Dr Franz Cede, former Austrian Ambassador to Russia and then to Belgium and currently University Professor of Diplomacy at the Andrassy University Budapest, has vacated the "Austrian chair" on the Steering Committee, which has traditionally been held by an Austrian diplomat who also teaches international law. Dr Cede's predecessor was Dr Winfried Lang. Dr Cede co-edited one of PIN's books and wrote a number of other works in English and German, and has been active in PIN projects to bridge the gap between analysts and practitioners.

These two members of the PIN Steering Committee have been succeeded by new members.

Dr Mark Anstey, formerly Director of the Labor Relations Unit at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University at Port Elizabeth, South Africa, and of the Institute for Industrial Relations, and currently teaching at Michigan State University in Dubai, joined the Steering Committee a year ago. Dr Anstey is author of a number of works on conflict and negotiation, and labor-management relations, and has contributed to past PIN books and to *PINPoints*. He

is now co-editing the current project on *Reducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Genocide*.

Dr Fen Osler Hampson, Director, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, has recently joined the Steering Committee. Dr Hampson, a political scientist, has worked on a number of publications with the US Institute of Peace and written extensively on issues of international politics. He is a contributor to PIN's *Sage Handbook on Conflict Resolution* and is currently co-editor of the forthcoming work on negotiations on the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Dr Valerie Rosoux of the Catholic University at Louvain, Belgium, has joined the Steering Committee. Dr Rosoux is a political scientist and a philosopher specializing in the study of reconciliation during and after negotiation; she has published several books and articles on the subject in French and in English. Her current work focuses on the Great Lakes Region of Africa. She contributed a chapter to PIN's *Sage Handbook on Conflict Resolution* and a chapter to the PIN book, *Peace versus Justice. Negotiating Forward- and Backward-Looking Outcomes*.

Dr Georg Stillfried, Director of the Department for Southern Europe at the Austrian Ministry for European and International Affairs is the new occupant of the "Austrian Chair" on the Steering Committee. Dr Stillfried was Austrian ambassador to Kuwait and has served on the law faculty of the Vienna and Danube Universities.

Dr Mikhail Troitskiy, associate professor of international relations at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), is the new holder of the "Russian Chair" and associate member of the Steering Committee. Dr Troitskiy has contributed to a number of works in English on international politics and Russian policy and has written in Russian on the subject. He is associated with PIN's Caspian Dialog (Caspilog) Project.

Dr Mordechai Melamud, Chief of Inspectorate and Training in the On-Site Inspection Division of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBT Organization, is an Israeli physicist who joins the PIN Steering Committee as associate member for the CTBT book. He has written extensively in international physics journals and has published on nuclear on-site inspections.



Mark Anstey



Rudolf Avenhaus



Guy Olivier Faure



Fen Osler Hampson



Paul Meerts



Mordechai Melamud



Valérie Rosoux



Gunnar Sjöstedt



Georg Stillfried



Mikhail Troitskiy



I. William Zartman



Ariel Macaspac

Science in International Policymaking

Continued from page 2



Source: Dreamstime.com

One well known example of IIASA's work is the RAINS model, which was so successfully used in the negotiations on long-range air pollution in Europe—the complex talks on acid rain.

on the same issues in international policymaking, such as the UN negotiation on climate warming. However, special efforts by both natural and social scientists are needed to generate cooperation synergies. Social scientists usually have but a shallow knowledge of the natural scientific issues that are addressed in international talks. Like policymakers and diplomats, analysts of international negotiation have to rely on the assistance of natural scientists in their capacity of issue experts. Negotiation analysts need to constantly look for better methods for assimilating relevant natural scientific issue knowledge in their analysis of international talks.

Similarly, natural scientists need to reach out for social scientific knowledge about negotiation processes and their dynamics in order to increase the actual operational usability of scientific knowledge in a negotiation. As both issue experts and negotiation analysts are well aware of the fact that the inflow of scientific knowledge into a negotiation sometimes causes problems in one way or another. For instance, policymakers may prefer a simpler discourse than scientific language. Scientific issue knowledge often needs to be somewhat adapted to fit the conditions set by the political dimension of the international negotiation to which it pertains. Political circumstances

may require a narrower—or broader—focus on a critical issue than what is adequate in scientific analysis and reports. Natural scientists strive to structure uncertainty by

means of probability estimates, whereas policymakers tend to prefer unstructured certainty. In their capacity as process experts, negotiation analysts are in a position to help natural scientists to develop methods to cope with obstacles impeding their communication with the critical actors in an international negotiation.

There is hence an opportunity for natural and social scientists to join forces for the purpose of increasing the usability and effectiveness of scientific knowledge in international talks concerning technically highly complex, for instance, climate warming or other environmental issues. IIASA is in a good position to undertake this kind of interdisciplinary work, which could have the shape of straight operational cooperation for the purpose of facilitating an ongoing international negotiation. Another approach, which is particularly suitable for PIN, would be interdisciplinary research involving natural scientists and negotiation analysts who, together, would determine the best conditions for effective transfer of knowledge/information into an ongoing international negotiation.



Source: NASA

Russia's Volga River (running south through the center) emptying into the northern portion of the Caspian Sea. The waters of the Caspian Sea are quite murky in this image, highlighting the water quality problems plaguing the sea. The sea is inundated with sewage and industrial and agricultural waste, which is having measurable impact on human health and wildlife. IIASA is one of the international groups are currently joining together to find strategies of dealing with the environmental problems of the Caspian Sea through its PIN Program.

PIN Book Review



International Negotiation

A Chinese translation of the book *International Negotiation* has been published. There were three main translators, with 47 more giving additional support. The publisher is the well known Hua Xia and the selling price of just 48 RMB (about 5 Euros or US\$7.35) makes the book widely accessible.




Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes


A Greek translation of *Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes* has recently been published by Kastaniotis Editions S.A., Athens. Edited by Guy Olivier Faure and the late Jeffrey Z. Rubin, the book was originally published in 1993 by Sage Publications.



In *Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts*, steering committee members I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure bring together European and American scholars to examine this important topic and define the point where the concepts and practices of escalation and negotiation meet.



Peace versus Justice: Negotiating Forward- and Backward-Looking Outcomes, edited by I. William Zartman and Victor Kremenyuk, examines the desired and achievable mix between negotiation strategies that look backward to end current hostilities and those that look ahead to prevent their recurrence.



In the PIN book *Diplomacy Games*, edited by Rudolf Avenhaus and I. William Zartman, leading experts in international negotiations present a number of formal models of conflict resolution and international negotiations. *Diplomacy Games* is published by Springer in association with IIASA.



The European Union can be perceived as an enormous bilateral and multilateral process of internal and external negotiation. *Negotiating European Union* examines negotiations within and among member states, within and among the institutions of the Union, and between the EU and other countries.