20 March 2014

IIASA Seminar by Karl Sigmund

IIASA Alumni are cordially invited to the next IIASA seminar on Thursday, 20 March.

IIASA Seminar: Partners and rivals in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Thursday, 20 March
16:00, IIASA Environment Room

by Karl Sigmund, Senior Research Scholar in IIASA's Evolution and Ecology Program  


Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair solution will be penalized by obtaining a reduced payoff. A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player. A player using a zero-determinant strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between the two players' payoffs. These properties hold for every strategy used by the co-player, whether memory-one or not.

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Last edited: 18 February 2014


Monika Bauer

IIASA Network and Alumni Officer Communications and External Relations Department

IIASA Network and Alumni Officer Communications - Communications and External Relations Department

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