Equitable governance of common goods

This collaboration between the Evolution and Ecology Program (EEP) and the Risk, Policy and Vulnerability Program (RPV), uses a broad range of approaches to bridge the gap between real-world case studies and game-theoretical models, with experimental economics and agent-based models as intermediary stepping stones.

• The work has found that a well-calibrated combination of positive and negative incentives (“first carrot, then stick”) can overcome the threat of exploitation of joint enterprises and bolster cooperation more effectively and efficiently than positive or negative incentives alone [1].
• A new model of corruption extended earlier studies of social commitment and costly punishment [2] (Figure 1). Corruption poses a widespread threat to the governance of the commons, and the EEP analysis was motivated by the illegal logging prevailing in many countries.
• Many of the basic ideas in game theory go back to John Nash, a legendary mathematician who won both the Nobel Prize and the Abel Prize. After his tragic death in 2015, EEP took the lead in publishing a review that reflected on his seminal work [3].
• The well-known iterated prisoner’s dilemma game is the workhorse of cooperation theory. Using a newly developed technique of so-called zero-determinant strategies, a recent EEP study determined when strategic interactions develop patterns of partnership or rivalry, respectively [4].
• A groundbreaking book by Sergio Rinaldi and colleagues reviewed the social dynamics of the couple—arguably the most fundamental social unit—and illustrated their new approach with case studies of famous historical couples [5].
• Temporary bluffing can sometimes promote a beneficial transition from bad to good social states by setting in motion a spiral of positive feedback [6]. The ubiquity of bluffing and posturing in animal societies is related to the cultural phenomenon of fashion in human societies, and new mathematical models were developed by EEP researchers to describe the role of fashion as a means of social diversification [7].
• EEP researchers investigated the effectiveness of taking advice regarding social judgment and decision making, and showed that weighting advice is often preferable to averaging or choosing advice [8].

Figure 1. A new game-theoretical model of corruption shows how difficult it is to escape the corruption trap: once defecting agents and corrupt enforcers have taken root in a society (orange trajectories), the transition to cooperating agents and honest enforcers (green trajectories) requires a massive perturbation [2].

Last edited: 07 April 2016